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Abstract
In the remember/know paradigm, a Bknow^ response can be defined to participants as a high-confidence state of certainty or as a
low-confidence state based on a feeling of familiarity. To examine the effects of definition on use of responses, in two experi-
ments, definitions of Bremember^ and Bguess^ were kept constant, but definitions of Bknow^ and/or Bfamiliar^ were systemat-
ically varied to emphasize (a) a subjective experience of high confidence without recollection, (b) a feeling of familiarity, (c) both
of these subjective experiences combined within one response option, or (d) both of these experiences as separate response
options. The confidence expressed in Bknow^ and/or Bfamiliar^ definitions affected how participants used response options.
Importantly, this included use of the Bremember^ response, which tended to be used more frequently when the nonrecollection-
based middle response option emphasized a feeling of familiarity rather than an experience of Bjust knowing.^ The influence of
the definitions on response patterns was greater for items that had undergone deep rather than shallow processing, and was greater
when deep-encoded and shallow-encoded items were mixed, rather than blocked, at test. Our findings fit with previous research
suggesting that the mnemonic traces underlying subjective judgments are continuous and that the remember/know paradigm is
not a pure measure of underlying processes. Findings also emphasize the importance of researchers publishing the exact
definitions they have used to enable accurate comparisons across studies.
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The remember/know (RK) paradigm has been used extensive-
ly in the past four decades to study subjective experiences of
recognition (see Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012; Yonelinas,
2002, for reviews). Here, recognized items are categorized as
Bremember^ when the participant recollects something that
was thought or experienced at the time of encoding and cate-
gorized as Bknow^ when the participant judges that the item
was studied but does not recall any associated information
(Tulving, 1985). How to interpret know responses has been
called Bthe most vexatious problem in the remember/know
paradigm^ (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000, p. 238).
A key contributor to this problem has been the variation in RK
instructions provided to participants by different researchers,
particularly with regard to how the know response option is
defined.
As shown in Table 1, when instructing participants on what
recognition experience should be categorized as a know re-
sponse, some researchers include both familiarity and confi-
dence in one response option, whereas others emphasize either
familiarity or confidence. Arguing that confusion could arise
between preexisting connotations of the confidence associated
with Bknowing^ and how it is defined experimentally, some
researchers ask participants to make remember/familiar judg-
ments instead of remember/know, while others have used neu-
tral terms such as Type A memory and Type B instead of
remember and know (Bowler, Gardiner, & Gaigg, 2007;
Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000; Levine et al., 1998;
McCabe & Geraci, 2009; Wheeler & Stuss, 2003). Finally,
know and familiar have also been separated as response op-
tions by some researchers (Barber, Rajaram, & Marsh, 2008;
Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997;
Dewhurst, Conway, & Brandt, 2009; Sauerland & Sporer,
2009; Wright & Sladden, 2003).
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To examine if differences in how remember and know
responses are defined alter how participants use these
response categories, Geraci, McCabe, and Guillory (2009)
compared responses to two sets of RK definitions (Rajaram,
1993; Yonelinas, 2001) against responses to sure/unsure con-
fidence judgments; the know definitions they compared are
included in Table 1. They found that when confidence was
emphasized in the definition of know (Experiment 1), patterns
Table 1 Selection of quotations detailing how nonrecollective subjective experiences were described to participants in a range of studies
Authors Response options
in experiment
Representative quote and/or definitions provided to participants
Gardiner & Java (1990) Remember
Know
BOften, when remembering a previous event or occurrence, we consciously recollect and
become aware of aspects of the previous experience. At other times, we simply know
that something has occurred before, but without being able consciously to recollect
anything about its occurrence or what we experienced at the time.^ (p. 25, emphasis in
original).
Rajaram (1993) Remember
Know
B‘Know’ responses should be made when you recognize that the word was in the study
list but you cannot consciously recollect anything about its actual occurrence or what
happened or what was experienced at the time of its occurrence. In other words, write
‘K’ (for ‘know’) when you are certain of recognizing the words but these words fail to
evoke any specific conscious recollection from the study list.^ (p. 102, emphasis
added)
Bastin & Van der Linden (2003) Remember
Know
Guess
B...classify a ‘yes’ response . . . as ‘Know’ if you do not remember any information
associated with the face. You are sure that you have seen it because you have a strong
feeling of familiarity, but you do not remember any information encoded with the
face^ (p. 24, emphasis added).
Bastin, Van der Linden, Michel, &
Friedman (2004; recognition task)
Remember
Familiar
Guess
BI ask you to say ‘Familiar’ if you recognize a picture but do not remember any
particular aspect of the encoding episode. But, still, you are certain that you have seen
the picture, because you have a feeling of familiarity^ (p. 168, emphasis added).
Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson &
Cohen (1997)
Remember
Know
Familiar
Guess
BYou might ‘just know’ the correct answer and the alternative you have selected ‘stood
out’ from the three choices available. In this case you would not recall a specific
episode and instead you would simply know the answer. Answers with this basis are
called KNOWanswers. . . . It may be, however, that you did not remember a specific
instance, nor do you know the answer. Nevertheless the alternative you have selected
may seem or feel more familiar than any of the other alternatives. Answers made on
this basis are called FAMILIAR answers^ (p. 398).
Dewhurst & Anderson (1999) Remember
Know
Guess
BA know response is one in which you recognize the item because it feels familiar in this
context, but you cannot recall its actual occurrence in the earlier phase of the
experiment. You recognize the item purely on the basis of a feeling of familiarity^ (p.
667, emphasis added).
Dobbins, Kroll, & Liu (1998) Remember
Familiar
BWe chose to use the word ‘familiar’ because students often confuse the more standard
‘know’ response with an expression of high confidence^ (p.1309).
Donaldson, MacKenzie, & Underhill
(1996)
Remember
Familiar
B...familiar rather than know was used to indicate nonrecollection, because the word
know carries a connotation of certainty that is inconsistent with a confidence rating
that indicates lack of certainty. Participants find it hard to say that they are unsure that
an item was there but that they know it was^ (p. 487, emphasis in original).
Geraci, McCabe, & Guillory (2009) Remember
Know
Experiment 1, confidence emphasized: BYou should make a know judgment if you
recognize the item from the study list, but you cannot consciously recollect anything
about its actual occurrence or what happened or what was experienced at the time of
its occurrence. In other words, write ‘know’ when you are certain that you recognize
the item, but it fails to evoke any specific conscious recollection from the study list^
(p. 707, emphasis added).
Experiment 2, confidence not emphasized: BYou should respond know, by writing
‘know’ on the blank, if you think the item was studied but you cannot recollect any
details about the study event^ (p.708).
Harlow, MacKenzie, & Donaldson
(2010)
Recollect
Familiar
BParticipants are trained to distinguish between familiarity and recollection (rather than
the potentially misleading terms knowing and remembering)^ (p. 1385, emphasis in
original).
Ingram, Mickes, & Wixted (2012) Remember
Familiar
B...we exchanged know with familiar in an attempt to reduce confusion between the
colloquial and experimental use of know^ (p. 328, emphasis in original).
Adapted fromWilliams andMoulin (2015). Definitions fromGardiner and Java (1990) and Rajaram (1993) are provided first, as these are often referred
to in the literature as Bstandard definitions^
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of RK judgments differed across words and nonwords, where-
as confidence judgments (sure/unsure) did not (replicating the
standard finding; e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990). In contrast,
when confidence was not emphasized in how know was de-
fined, patterns were similar for remember/know and sure/
unsure (Experiment 2). This demonstrates that how subjective
states are defined can have important implications for inter-
pretations of RK responses, particularly regarding the relation-
ship between subjective experience and confidence (Geraci
et al., 2009; see also McCabe & Geraci, 2009). Geraci
et a l .’s (2009) results are informative regarding
how emphasizing confidence in the definition can alter how
participants use the know response. However, because Geraci
et al. compared RK instructions from different labs, the
way that a remember response was defined to participants
also differed across their experiments. In their Experiment 1,
instructions for making a remember judgment were as
follows:
You should make a remember judgment if you can
consciously recollect i ts prior occurrence.
Remember [sic] is the ability to become conscious-
ly aware again of some aspect or aspects of what
happened or what was experienced at the time the
word was presented (e.g., aspects of the physical
appearance of the item, or of something that hap-
pened in the room, or of what you were thinking
or doing at the time). In other words, the
Bremembered^ word should bring back to mind a
particular association, image, or something more
personal from the time of study, or something
about its appearance or position (i.e., what came
before or after that word). (p. 707)
After knowing was defined, real-world remember and
know-type retrieval examples were given, and the par-
ticipant was asked for instances from their own life that
they would classify as remember and know. In contrast,
in Experiment 2, Geraci et al.’s (2009) participants re-
ceived these rather more simple instructions for making
remember judgments:
You should make a remember judgment if you can re-
member some qualitative information about the study
event. This could include such things as recollecting
what you were thinking about when the word was pre-
sented, what the word looked like, or what it sounded
like. Moreover, you should write Bremember^ on the
blank only if you can, if asked, tell the experimenter
what you recollected about the study event. (p.708)
This instruction was followed by the know instruction
(shown in Table 1) and no examples were given to, or
requested from, the participant. Though both remember in-
structions focus on recollection of associated information
from time of study, more details and examples of recollection
were provided in the instructions given in their Experiment 1.
Experiments by Rotello, Macmillan, Reeder, and Wong
(2005) compared traditional remember instructions (after
Rajaram, 1993) against more conservative remember instruc-
tions. These specified that participants should only respond
remember if they could describe specific details of the study
episode and that they might need to justify their responses to
the experimenter. The more conservative instructions led to
fewer remember hits and fewer remember false alarms
compared with traditional instructions. Thus, the patterns
reported by Geraci et al. (2009) could have been influenced
by the fact that remember definitions were not kept constant
across their experiments.
As well as how knowing is defined, another methodologi-
cal issue in the RK paradigm is whether a guess response
option should be permitted (Bruno & Rutherford, 2010;
Eldridge, Sarfatti, & Knowlton, 2002). A guess category
was first introduced to the RK paradigm by Mäntylä (1993),
but studies by Gardiner and colleagues were the first that
specifically set out to compare results fromRK paradigms that
did versus did not allow guess responses (Gardiner, Java, &
Richardson-Klavehn, 1996a; Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, &
Java, 1996b; Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi,
1997). Gardiner, Java, et al. (1996) concluded that participants
sometimes use know responses as a substitute for guesses
when guessing is neither explicitly prohibited nor allowed,
but when a guess response option is provided know responses
demonstrate memory for the experimental episode, whereas
guesses show no discriminative power. Moreover, Gardiner
et al. (1997) demonstrated that effects of a response criteria
manipulation on patterns of know responses by Strack and
Förster (1995) were removed when a guess option was includ-
ed. Strack and Förster had concluded that patterns of know
responding were influenced by factors other than memory for
the study episode (e.g., judgmental strategies relating to re-
sponse rates). In contrast, Gardiner et al. (1997) presented
evidence that only guess responses were affected by such
factors.
This conclusion was supported by a qualitative analysis by
Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998), who
found that participants’ justifications for guesses showed evi-
dence of various inferences and other judgmental strategies
that were not directly related to the individual’s memory for
a studied word. For example, familiarity inferences such as
BHoliday: I am eager to go on holiday, so I am not sure wheth-
er I saw it here or whether I was thinking about it^; or strategic
responding, like BHarp: It seemed that there were quite a few
musical instruments, so I took a guess that it came up^ (both p.
8). Importantly, know justifications did not include any evi-
dence of use of inferences or judgmental strategies. In his
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review, Gardiner (2008) asserted that if a researcher’s primary
interest is reports of subjective experience as opposed to over-
all memory accuracy, then inclusion of a guess category is
beneficial as it reduces the likelihood that participants will
assign guesses to the know category (cf. Migo et al., 2012).
Inclusion of a guess option is also important for analysis, as
it makes the RK judgment nonbinary. A guess response option
was not included in the comparison of know definitions per-
formed by Geraci et al. (2009); therefore, differences in the
know definition across their experiments would not only have
changed proportion of items assigned to know but they would
have also necessarily changed the proportion of items
assigned to remember. In the current experiments, inclusion
of a guess option makes the RK judgment nonbinary, and thus
if changes to the know definition alter patterns of know usage,
this will not necessarily result in changes to the proportion of
items assigned to remember.
The aim of the current experiments was to test how changes
in how nonrecol lec t ion-based response opt ions
(know/familiar) are defined influences patterns of responses.
To test this systematically, definitions of remember and guess
responses were kept constant across participants, but defini-
tions of know and/or familiar were varied to emphasize either
a subjective experience of high confidence without recollec-
tion (RKG condition), a feeling of familiarity (RFG condi-
tion), both of these subjective experiences combined within
one response option (RKfG condition), or both of these expe-
riences as separate response options (RKFG condition); full
definitions are shown in Table 2.
Our hypothesis is that if recollection is more of a
continuous process (e.g., Bodner & Lindsay, 2003;
Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997; Gruppuso,
Lindsay, & Masson, 2007; Ingram et al., 2012; Wixted
& Mickes, 2010), then the extent to which the
nonrecollection-based response option emphasizes confi-
dence or familiarity could influence how participants
assign items to remember. A Bknow^ option that sounds
more confident may result in fewer recognized items
being assigned to Bremember^ than a Bfamiliar^ option
that is defined in terms of a feeling of familiarity.
A second factor tested in the current experiments was
whether patterns of responding differed across levels of pro-
cessing. The deeper the encoding, the greater the amount of
contextual elaborative information likely to be available for
retrieval (via recollection) at test (e.g., Gardiner, 1988).
Thus, differences in how nonrecollection-based definitions
are worded may have a smaller effect on retrieval of items
that were deeply encoded and therefore have more associat-
ed information available on which to make a remember re-
sponse. In Experiment 1, target items either underwent shal-
low or deep encoding, and the recognition test included
shallow-encoded targets, deep-encoded targets, and novel
lure items.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design Data were collected online using
Qualtrics (between July 2013 and March 2016). The
experiment was advertised on international psychology
experiment websites, the crowdsourcing website
CrowdFlower, and e-mailed to participant lists.
Participants recruited from CrowdFlower were compen-
sated $0.50 for their participation. Undergraduate stu-
dents from Keele University received participation credit
for their time. Data sets were excluded from analysis if
proportion of false alarms (FAs) suggested participants
had not understood the instructions or had been guess-
ing (z scores of >±3; n = 9) or if they had not given
appropriate justifications for their response categories at
the end of the experiment (n = 18). This left 435 par-
ticipants for analysis (302 female; mean age = 27.53
years, SD = 12.28, range: 18–78); a priori power to
detect a small effect (Cohen’s d = .30) with this size
sample was calculated at .99 (G*Power Version 3.1.5;
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The experi-
ment employed a mixed design with two within-
subjects encoding conditions (deep and shallow process-
ing; order counterbalanced) crossed with four between-
subjects retrieval judgment conditions (RKG, RFG,
RKFG, and RKfG). Participants were randomly allocat-
ed to encoding order and retrieval condition1; Ns for
each retrieval condition are shown in Table 3.
Stimuli were medium-frequency nouns obtained from the
MRC Psycholinguistic Database (mean familiarity rating
of 427; range: 400–480) limited to between five and
seven letters in length (mean log-HAL frequency =
7.49; English Lexicon Project). Four lists were created;
each list contained 24 items (see osf.io/vecmn for
stimuli lists). Each participant studied two lists, one
under shallow-encoding instructions and one under
deep-encoding instructions. The other two lists were
used as lure stimuli on the recognition test. Use of lists
as target or lure stimuli was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. Two primacy and recency fillers were shown
at the start and end of each study list; half (four) of
these studied fillers were included at the start of the
recognition test alongside four lure fillers. Fillers were
not included in analysis.
1 Order did not significantly interact with retrieval condition in any analysis
(smallest p = .107 for analysis of hits made to shallow-encoded items in
Experiment 1), so results for both experiments are reported collapsed across
order.
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Procedure After giving informed consent and providing de-
mographic information, participants received instructions
about a mental rotation task that was used as a distractor task
(backwards/forwards response with letter and number stimuli
rotated 0, 60, 120, 180, 240, or 300 degrees from vertical).
Participants were then told that they would be shown two lists
of words that they should learn for the memory test later.
Participants were shown example stimuli screens for the shal-
low (BDoes this word contain the letter a?^ yes/no) and deep
(BHow pleasant is this word?^ 1–6 scale) encoding conditions
and then began their first study list (order of shallow and deep
encoding counterbalanced across participants). For both lists,
stimuli were shown individually in the center of the screen and
disappeared when the participant made a response. Order of
stimuli presentationwas randomized anew for each participant
by Qualtrics.
After studying the first list, participants were instructed
about what type of judgment they would be making for the
second study list (i.e., the level of encoding they had not done
for the first list). At the end of the second list, participants
completed the mental rotation task (12 items) as a distractor
task. At the start of the test phase, participants were instructed
that on the memory test half of the items would be words they
had seen in the study phase—some of these would have come
from the first list and some from the second list—and that the
rest of the items would be new words that they had not seen in
the study phase. Participants were told that each word would
be shown individually on the screen and that their first task
was to decide whether the word was Bold^ (seen in the study
phase) or Bnew^ (not seen in the study phase) and were shown
an example stimulus screen (showing one of the examples
they had seen prior to the study lists). Participants were
instructed that if they thought a word was an Bold^ word, then
they would be asked to make a judgment about their experi-
ence of recognizing that word. An example screen and the
definitions appropriate to their retrieval condition were
Table 2 Subjective experience response category definitions and the retrieval conditions in which they were used
Condition(s) Subjective experience response category and definition
RKG
RFG
RKFG
RKfG
REMEMBER = You have an experience of recollection for the word. This could include being consciously aware of some aspect or
aspects of what was experienced at the time the word was presented in the learning phase (e.g., aspects of the physical appearance of the
item, or of something that happened in the room, or of what you were thinking or doing at the time). In other words, you should choose
BRemember^ if you have a sense of yourself in the past and/or the word brings back to mind a particular association, image, or thought,
from the time of study. For example, if you see someone on the street, you may think, BWho is that? Oh yes, it’s the person I saw in line in
the book store. I remember thinking what a funny hat they had on . . . .^
RKG
RKFG
KNOW = You feel that you just know that the word was a word you saw in the learning phase, but you cannot consciously recollect
anything about its actual occurrence or what was experienced at the time of its occurrence. In other words, you should choose BKnow^
if you know the item was one you studied, but you cannot recollect any details associated with seeing it before. For example, if you see
someone on the street, youmay think BWho is that? I know I've seen that person before, but I don't recall where that would have been…^
RFG
RKFG
FAMILIAR = You have a feeling of familiarity with the word and because of that you think that the word was one you saw in the learning
phase. In other words, you should choose BFamiliar^ if the word feels familiar to you.For example, if you see someone on the street you
may think, BWho is that? They look very familiar . . . I don’t know why, but they seem familiar . . . .^
RKfG KNOW = You feel that you just know that the word was a word you saw in the learning phase, or you have a feeling of familiarity for the
word, but you cannot consciously recollect anything about its actual occurrence or what was experienced at the time of its occurrence. In
other words, you should choose BKnow^ if the word feels familiar or if you know the itemwas one you studied, but you cannot recollect
any details associated with seeing it before.For example, if you see someone on the street, you may think, BWho is that? I know I’ve seen
that person before, but I don’t recall where that would have been . . .^ or youmay think BThey look very familiar. . . I don’t knowwhy, but
they seem familiar . . . .^
RKG
RFG
RKFG
RKfG
GUESS = You do not have any memories or feelings associated with the word, and you are simply guessing that the word was one of the
words you saw in the learning phase.
Table 3 Means [between-subjects 95% CIs] of recognition performance measures by retrieval condition, Experiment 1
Condition N Deep proportion hit Shallow proportion hit Proportion false alarms d′ c
RKfG 112 .84 [.81, .87] .56 [.52, .60] .13 [.11, .15] 1.78 [1.66, 1.90] 0.31 [0.23, 0.39]
RKFG 105 .85 [.82, .88] .54 [.50, .58] .14 [.12, .16] 1.76 [1.63, 1.88] 0.33 [0.25, 0.41]
RKG 106 .85 [.82, .88] .55 [.51, .59] .13 [.11, .15] 1.77 [1.65, 1.90] 0.32 [0.24, 0.40]
RFG 112 .85 [.82, .88] .56 [.52, .60] .15 [.13, .17] 1.74 [1.61, 1.86] 0.27 [0.20, 0.35]
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presented (definitions are shown in Table 2). Participants were
told that the definitions would always be shown at the bottom
of the page as a reminder, but that they should try to learn them
so that they could make their experience judgments quickly
and easily. On the recognition test, stimuli were shown indi-
vidually in the center of the screen. If the participant
responded that a word was Bold,^ the recognition experience
judgment options replaced the old/new judgment options be-
low the word with the full definitions shown at the bottom of
the page. If the participant responded that a word was Bnew,^
the next item was shown.
For all phases of the experiment, participants were
instructed to respond as quickly as possible while remaining
accurate. All responses were made using the mouse. In be-
tween each item, a fixation point (B+^) was shown in the
center of the screen for 1 second.
To ensure that participants had been using the subjective
experience response categories appropriately, at the end of the
recognition test participants were asked to provide a brief
description of what they meant when they used each response
option; 18 participants were excluded on the basis of their
justifications (see Participants section). Participants were then
invited to give comments about the experiment, and the pur-
pose of the experiment was described.
Results and discussion
Recognition performance To examine whether retrieval con-
dition had influenced recognition performance, proportion of
hits and FAs, and signal detection measures of discrimination
(d′) and response bias (c), were compared across conditions;
means are shown in Table 3. As calculation of d′ and c in-
volves numbers of FAs, but shallow-encoded and deeply-
encoded items had not been blocked in the test phase d′ and
c are calculated across the whole set of studied items. The
Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) correction was also employed
so that d′ and c could still be calculated when a participant had
not made any FAs. Partial eta-squared (ηp
2) is reported as a
measure of effect size.
A 2 (encoding condition: shallow, deep) × 4 (retrieval con-
dition: RKfG, RKFG, RKG, RFG) mixed ANOVA on hits
showed a significant main effect of encoding, with deep
encoding resulting in more hits than shallow encoding, F(1,
431) = 968.11,MSE = .019, p < .001, ηp
2 = .69. There was no
significant effect of retrieval condition, F(3, 431) = 0.81,MSE
= .060, p = .97, ηp
2 = .004, and no significant interaction
between encoding and retrieval condition, F(3, 431) = 0.54,
MSE = .019, p =.66, ηp
2 = .004. One-way ANOVAs on pro-
portion of FAs, F(3, 431) = .60, MSE = .012, p = .62, ηp
2 =
.004; discrimination, d’, F(3, 431) = .09,MSE = .445, p = .97,
ηp
2 = .001; and response bias, c, F(3, 431) = .34,MSE = .175,
p = .80, ηp
2 = .002, also did not demonstrate a significant
difference across retrieval conditions. The different subjective
experience response options participants were given did not
detectably alter their recognition performance
In addition to this traditional null hypothesis significance
testing approach, we also computed Bayes factors to assess
the strength of evidence supporting the experimental or null
hypothesis for crucial analyses (see Appendix A at osf.io/
vecmn/). For hits, we conducted a Bayesian ANOVA (using
JASP Version 0.9; JASP Team, 2018), which compared the
following four different models against a null ANOVAmodel:
(1) a model that included only an effect of encoding, (2) a
model that included only an effect of retrieval condition, (3)
a model that included an effect of encoding and an effect of
retrieval condition, and (4) a model that included both main
effects of encoding and retrieval condition plus an effect of the
interaction of those two factors. Each model has a Bayes fac-
tor associated with it, which quantifies the relative strength of
evidence in support of that model in comparison to the null
model (larger Bayes factors indicate stronger support for the
model under consideration in comparison to the null model).
We then compared these Bayes factors to see which model
predicted the data the best. First, we took the model with the
highest overall BF to be the best fitting model. Second, we
compared how well this model fit the data in comparison with
the next-best model by taking the ratio of the two model’s
Bayes factors from step 1; this produces a new Bayes factor
that quantifies the degree of superiority of the best model. Our
analysis showed that for hits, a model that just included
encoding predicted the data the best. The next-best model
was the model that included both encoding and retrieval con-
dition, but the encoding-only model was preferred over the
encoding + retrieval condition model by a Bayes factor of
56.29; this gives very strong evidence that encoding was the
only factor that influenced participants’ hit rates (classification
specified by Wagenmakers et al., 2018).
For proportion of false alarms, d′, and c (and subsequent
analyses), comparison of models was simpler as there was no
effect of encoding to consider (i.e., the Bayesian ANOVA had
to compare against the null model only a model that included
an effect of retrieval condition). The model that included the
retrieval condition was preferred over the null model by a
Bayes factor of: 0.021 for false alarms, 0.015 for response bias
(c), and 0.010 for discrimination (d′), giving very strong evi-
dence in support of the null hypothesis that retrieval condition
had no effect on these measures.
Use of subjective experience response options To directly
compare the proportions of responses assigned to the
nonrecollection-based (Bmiddle^) response option(s), propor-
tions assigned to know and/or familiar responses were allocat-
ed to a new BKF^ variable in the following ways for the
different retrieval conditions: RKFG = proportion K + propor-
tion F summed; RKG = proportion K; RFG = proportion F;
RKfG = proportion Kf. To examine whether the different
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response option definitions changed participants’ responding,
separate 4 (retrieval condition: RKfG, RKFG, RKG, RFG)
one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the proportion of items
assigned to remember, the pooled KF category, and guess for
correctly recognized items studied under shallow or deep
encoding conditions, and for FAs on lure items. Data are
shown in Fig. 1 (including proportions assigned to raw know
and/or familiar response options).
Deep encoding For items that had undergone deep encoding,
there was a significant main effect of retrieval condition on
proportion assigned to remember, F(3, 431) = 5.12, MSE =
.074, p = .002, ηp
2 = .034. Pairwise comparisons using a
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of .008 for six comparisons
indicated that the proportion of hits assigned to remember was
significantly larger in the RFG condition than in the RKfG
condition (p < .001), or in the RKFG condition (p = .006);
the proportion of hits assigned to remember was numerically
higher in the RFG condition than in the RKG condition, but
that difference was not significant (p = .021); no other com-
parisons were significant (smallest p = .17). Bayesian
ANOVA resulted in a Bayes factor of 8.82 for a model includ-
ing retrieval condition, providing moderate evidence that re-
trieval condition influenced proportion of deep hits assigned
to remember.
For the pooled KF response category, there was a signifi-
cant main effect of retrieval condition on proportion assigned
to KF, F(3, 431) = 6.63, MSE = .039, p < .001, ηp
2 = .044. A
larger proportion of hits were assigned to KF in the RKfG
condition (M = .21, 95% CI [.18, .25]) or the RKFG condition
(M = .20, 95% CI [.17, .24]) than in the RFG condition (M =
.11, 95% CI [.07, .14]; both ps < .001). The proportion of hits
assigned to KF was also numerically higher in the RKG con-
dition (M = .17, 95% CI [.13, .21]) than in the RFG condition,
but using the Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level, the difference
was not significant (p = .013). The Bayes factor was 66.52 for
a model including retrieval condition, providing very strong
evidence that retrieval condition influenced proportion of deep
hits assigned to KF.
There was a significant main effect of retrieval condition on
proportion assigned to guess, F(3, 431) = 5.71,MSE = .002, p
= .001, ηp
2 = .038. A greater proportion of items were
assigned to guess in the RKfG condition and the RKG condi-
tion compared to in the RFG condition (p ≤ .001 and p = .002,
respectively). The proportion of hits assigned to guess was
numerically higher in the RKfG condition and the RKG con-
dition than in the RKFG condition, but using the Bonferroni-
adjusted alpha level, these differences were not significant (p
= .010 and p = .014, respectively); no other comparisons were
significant (smallest p = .52). Fewer than .04 of responses
were assigned to guess in any of the retrieval conditions.
The Bayes factor was 19.17 for a model including retrieval
condition, providing strong evidence that retrieval condition
influenced proportion of deep hits assigned to guess.
Shallow encoding For items that had undergone shallow
encoding, there was a significant main effect of retrieval con-
dition on proportion assigned to remember, F(3, 431) = 3.73,
MSE = .046, p = .011, ηp
2 = .025. A larger proportion of hits
were assigned to remember in the RFG condition than in the
RKFG condition (p = .001); no other comparisons were sig-
nificant (smallest p = .06) for the RKG versus RKFG compar-
ison. The Bayes factor was 1.36 for a model including retriev-
al condition, providing only anecdotal evidence that retrieval
Fig. 1 Mean proportions of hits and false alarms (FAs) assigned to Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess in each of the retrieval conditions in
Experiment 1. A table of means with their 95% CIs is available in the supplemental files (osf.io/vecmn)
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condition influenced proportion of shallow hits assigned to
remember.
For the pooled KF response category, there was a signifi-
cant main effect of retrieval condition on proportion assigned
to KF, F(3, 431) = 7.10, MSE = .022, p < .001, ηp
2 = .047. A
larger proportion of hits were assigned to KF in the RKFG
condition (M = .27, 95% CI [.24, .30]) than in the RKfG
condition (M = .18, 95% CI [.16, .21]; p < .001), RKG con-
dition (M = .20, 95% CI [.17, .23]; p = .001), or the RFG
condition (M = .20, 95% CI [.17, .23]; p = .001). The Bayes
factor was 120.28 for a model including retrieval condition,
providing extremely strong evidence that retrieval condition
influenced proportion of shallow hits assigned to KF.
There was a significant main effect of retrieval condition on
proportion assigned to guess, F(3, 431) = 14.12,MSE = .006, p
< .001, ηp
2 = .089. A greater proportion of items were assigned
to guess in the RKfG condition compared with any other con-
dition (RKfG vs. RKFG: p < .001; RKfG vs. RKG: p = .006;
RKfG vs. RFG: p < .001). Also, a greater proportion of items
were assigned to guess in the RKG condition compared with the
RFG condition (p = .002) and the RKFG condition (p = .022),
though this latter comparison did not meet the Bonferroni-
adjusted alpha level. More items were assigned to guess that
had undergone shallow encoding than had undergone deep
encoding, but still fewer than .10 of responses were assigned
to guess in any retrieval condition. The Bayes factor was 1.218
× 106 for a model including retrieval condition, providing ex-
tremely strong evidence that retrieval condition influenced pro-
portion of shallow hits assigned to guess.
False alarms to lures For lure items, the main effect of retrieval
condition on proportion of FAs assigned to remember was not
significant, F(3, 431) = 0.89,MSE = .003, p = .45, ηp
2 = .006.
The Bayes factor was 0.03 for a model including retrieval
condition, providing strong evidence that retrieval condition
did not influence proportion of false alarms assigned to
remember.
For the pooled KF response category, there was a significant
main effect of retrieval condition on proportion FAs assigned to
KF, F(3,431) = 6.67,MSE = .005, p = .001, ηp
2 = .044. A larger
proportion of FAs were assigned to KF in the RKFG condition
(M = .08, 95% CI [.06, .09]) and the RFG condition (M = .08,
95% CI [.07, .10]) than in the RKfG condition (M = .05, 95%
CI [.03, .06]; p = .001 and p < .001, respectively). The propor-
tion of FAs assigned to KF was also higher in the RFG condi-
tion than in the RKG condition (M = .06, 95% CI [.04, .07]; p =
.006). The proportion of FAs assigned to KF was also numer-
ically higher in the RKFG condition than in the RKG condition,
but using the Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level this difference
was not significant (p = .028). The Bayes factor was 69.37 for
a model including retrieval condition, providing very strong
evidence that retrieval condition influenced proportion of false
alarms assigned to KF.
There was a significant main effect of retrieval condition on
proportion assigned to guess, F(3, 431) = 7.13,MSE = .002, p
< .001, ηp
2 = .047. A greater proportion of FAs were assigned
to guess in the RKfG condition compared with in the RFG
condition or the RKFG condition (both ps < .001). The pro-
portion of FAs assigned to guess was numerically higher in the
RKG condition than in the RFG condition, but using the
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level this difference was not signif-
icant (p = .013); no other comparisons were significant
(smallest p = .061 for RKG vs. RKFG). The Bayes factor
was 127.40 for a model including retrieval condition, provid-
ing extremely strong evidence that retrieval condition influ-
enced proportion of false alarms assigned to guess.
Overall, different definitions for the nonrecollection-based
Bmiddle^ response option(s) resulted in a significant main ef-
fect of retrieval condition for all DVs: proportion of items
assigned to remember, KF, and guess (except for FAs on lure
items for which there was no main effect on remember re-
sponses). After deep encoding, more remember responses were
made when the Bmiddle^ response definition was based on a
feeling of familiarity only, rather than including a sense of Bjust
knowing^ or high confidence without recollection. This in-
crease in remember responses was accompanied by a decrease
in responses based on familiarity (F response in RFG condi-
tion). In addition, more guess responses were made when only
one Bmiddle^ response option was provided and the definitions
of this option included high confidence without recollection,
though guess responses were very infrequent overall.
For shallow-encoded items, the increase in remember re-
sponses was only evident when comparing RFG and RKFG
conditions, suggesting that when encoding was less elaborate
and less associated information was available for retrieval, par-
ticipants use the separate know and familiar options (in the
RKFG condition) more. Guess responses were again infre-
quent, but for shallow-encoded items, more guess responses
were made when the Bmiddle^ response option definition in-
cluded high confidence without recollection. These patterns for
KF and guess responses for shallow-encoded items were then
repeated for FAs to lure items. In sum, the overall influence of
the different definitions on response patterns appears to be
stronger after deep encoding compared with shallow encoding.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, target items either underwent shallow or deep
encoding, and the recognition test included shallow-encoded
targets, deep-encoded targets, and novel lure items, so recogni-
tion of items that had been shallowly or deeply encoded took
place in the context of the other type of item. However, previous
research has shown that test-list context affects how participants
use response options in an RK task (Bodner & Lindsay, 2003;
Tousignant & Bodner, 2012; Tousignant, Bodner, & Arnold,
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2015). Thus, in Experiment 2, we used a blocked procedure in
which the shallow and deep encoding phases were each follow-
ed by their own separate recognition test. If test-list context
influences how participants define remembering and knowing
for themselves during the task (Bodner & Lindsay, 2003), then
removing the context of the Bother^ type of encoded item in our
recognition test may lead to different patterns of responding
across the different retrieval judgment conditions (RKG,
RFG, RKfG, RKFG) on the deep and shallow tests.
Method
Details of participant recruitment, experimental design, stim-
uli, and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except
where noted.
Participants Data were collected online using Qualtrics (be-
tween February 2015 and April 2017). The experiment was
advertised on international psychology experiment websites,
and undergraduate students from Keele University received
participation credit for taking part. Data sets were excluded
from analysis if proportion of FAs suggested participants had
not understood the instructions or had been guessing (z scores
of >±3 for FAs in either block of the experiment, n = 13). This
left 431 full data sets for analysis (328 female; mean age =
21.50 years, SD = 7.72, range: 18–69).
Procedure The procedure was identical to that of Experiment
1, except that the shallow and deep encoding conditions each
had their own separate recognition test (i.e., participants com-
pleted two study-test blocks: one shallow-processing block
and one deep-processing block, order of blocks
counterbalanced across participants). The distractor task was
also changed from a mental rotation task to mathematical
sums; participants completed a set of distractor sums between
each study and test phase and also between the test phase for
Block 1 and the study phase for Block 2. After the final rec-
ognition test, participants were invited to give comments
about the experiment and the purpose of the experiment was
described. To minimize completion time in this more complex
two-block procedure, justifications of response categories
were not requested in this experiment.
Results and discussion
Recognition performance Recognition performance measures
were again compared across retrieval conditions; means are
shown in Table 4. Although proportion hits and FAs for deep-
ly encoded items are similar in this experiment compared with
Experiment 1, the separation of the shallow and deep tasks
into two separate study-test blocks apparently improved per-
formance on the shallow recognition test as proportion hit
increased by ~.14 (compare Tables 3 and 4).
Separate 2 (encoding condition: shallow, deep) × 4 (retriev-
al condition: RKfG, RKFG, RKG, RFG) mixed ANOVAs
were conducted on proportion of hits and FAs, and measures
d' and c. Each ANOVA showed a significant main effect of
encoding, as deep encoding resulted in more hits, F(1, 427) =
407.06, MSE = 0.019, p < .001, ηp
2 = .49; fewer FAs, F(1,
427) = 193.69, MSE = .008, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31; better dis-
crimination, d', F(1, 427) = 721.54, MSE = 0.426, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .63; and a less conservative response bias, c, F(1, 427) =
75.89, MSE = 0.096, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15, than shallow
encoding. No significant main effect of retrieval condition
was observed for any measure: proportion hit, F(3, 427) =
0.62, MSE = 0.067, p = .61, ηp
2 = .004; proportion FAs,
F(3, 427) = 1.38, MSE = 0.017, p = .25, ηp
2 = .010; discrim-
ination, d'; F(3, 427) = 0.11,MSE = 1.15, p = .95, ηp
2 = .001;
response bias, c, F(3, 427) = 1.44,MSE = 0.33, p = .23, ηp
2 =
.010; and there was no interaction between encoding condi-
tion and retrieval condition on any measure: proportion hit,
F(3, 427) = 1.49,MSE = 0.019, p =.22, ηp
2 = .010; proportion
FAs, F(3, 427) = 0.71, MSE = 0.008, p = .55, ηp
2 = .005;
discrimination, d', F(3, 427) = 0.60, MSE = 0.43, p = .62,
ηp
2 = .004; response bias, c, F(3, 427) = 1.21, MSE = 0.096,
p = .31, ηp
2 = .008. In this experiment the different subjective
experience response options participants were given again did
not affect their recognition performance, discrimination abili-
ty, or response bias.
We again computed Bayes factors for these analyses (see
Appendix B at osf.io/vecmn). For proportion hit, proportion
FAs, d', and c, each analysis confirmed that a model that
included only encoding predicted the data the best. For each
measure, the next best model was the model that included both
the encoding and retrieval condition, but the encoding-only
model was preferred over the encoding + retrieval condition
model by a Bayes factor of 9.51 for response bias (c), 15.60
for proportion FAs, 23.24 for proportion hit, and 65.91 for
discrimination (d'); this gives strong to very strong evidence
that encoding was the only factor that influenced performance
on each recognition measure.
Use of subjective experience response options To examine
whether the different response option definitions changed par-
ticipants’ responding, separate 4 (retrieval condition: RKfG,
RKFG, RKG, RFG) one-way ANOVAs were conducted on
the proportion of items assigned to remember, the pooled KF
response option, and guess, this time for both correctly recog-
nized items and FAs on lures in the shallow and deep recog-
nition tests; data for deep encoding are shown in Fig. 2 and
data for shallow encoding are shown in Fig. 3.
Deep encoding—hits For items that had undergone deep
encoding, there was a significant main effect of retrieval con-
dition on proportion assigned to remember, F(3, 427) = 7.19,
MSE = .091, p < .001, ηp
2 = .048. Pairwise comparisons using
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a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of .008 for six comparisons
indicated that a larger proportion of hits were assigned to
remember in the RFG condition than in the RKfG condition
(p < .001), or in the RKFG condition (p = .001). The propor-
tion of hits assigned to remember was also higher in the RKG
condition than in the RKfG condition (p =.004), and the
RKFG condition (p = .035), but the latter difference was not
significant. No other comparisons were significant (smallest p
= .25). The Bayes factor was 137.83 for a model including
retrieval condition, providing extremely strong evidence that
retrieval condition influenced proportion of deep hits assigned
to remember.
For the pooled KF response category there was a signifi-
cant main effect of retrieval condition on proportion assigned
to KF, F(3, 427) = 9.54, MSE = .048, p < .001, ηp
2 = .063. A
larger proportion of hits were assigned to KF in the RKfG
condition (M = .25, 95% CI [.21, .29]) than in the RFG con-
dition (M = .11, 95% CI [.06, .15]; p < .001) or the RKG
condition (M = .16, 95% CI [.12, .20]; p = .003). Similarly,
the proportion of hits assigned to KF was higher in the RKFG
condition (M = .22, 95% CI [.18, .27]) than in the RFG con-
dition (p < .001), and the RKG condition (p = .035), but using
the Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level the latter difference was
not significant. No other comparisons were significant
(smallest p = .08) for the RFG versus RKG comparison. The
Bayes factor was 3,090.75 for a model including retrieval
condition, providing extremely strong evidence that retrieval
condition influenced proportion of deep hits assigned to KF.
There was also a significant main effect of retrieval condi-
tion on proportion assigned to guess, F(3, 431) = 4.20,MSE =
.003, p = .006, ηp
2 = .029. A smaller proportion of hits were
assigned to guess in the RKFG condition comparedwith in the
RKfG condition (p = .001), or the RKG condition (p = .009).
Overall, fewer than .04 of responses were assigned to guess in
any retrieval condition. The Bayes factor was 2.60 for a model
including retrieval condition, providing only anecdotal evi-
dence that retrieval condition influenced proportion of deep
hits assigned to guess.
Deep encoding—false alarms For lures on the deep recogni-
tion test, the main effect of retrieval condition was not signif-
icant for proportion assigned to remember, F(3, 431) = 0.31,
MSE = .001, p = .82, ηp
2 = .002, or to the pooled KF response
category, F(3, 431) = 0.59, MSE = .002, p = .62, ηp
2 = .004.
Fewer than .02 FAs were assigned to remember and fewer
than .04 to KF on this test. For remember the Bayes factor
Table 4 Means [between-subjects 95% CIs] of recognition performance measures by retrieval condition, Experiment 2
Condition N Deep encoding Shallow Encoding
Prop. hit Prop. FA d′ c Prop. hit Prop. FA d′ c
RKfG 111 .88 [.84, .91] .08 [.06, .09] 2.82 [2.65, 3.00] .08 [−.01, .16] .72 [.68, .76] .17 [.15, .20] 1.64 [1.48, 1.80] .20 [.11, .29]
RKFG 108 .86 [.82, .89] .06 [.04, .08] 2.81 [2.64, 2.99] .17 [.08, .25] .68 [.64, .72] .14 [.11, .16] 1.71 [1.55, 1.87] .33 [.24, .43]
RKG 103 .90 [.86, .94] .07 [.06, .09] 2.91 [2.72, 3.09] .06 [−.03, .15] .69 [.65, .74] .15 [.12, .17] 1.67 [1.51, 1.83] .29 [.19, .37]
RFG 109 .86 [.85, .92] .07 [.05, .09] 2.88 [2.70, 3.06] .08 [−.01, .17] .68 [.64, .72] .15 [.13, .18] 1.62 [1.46, 1.78] .30 [.21, .39]
Fig. 2 Mean proportions of hits and FAs on the deep recognition test assigned to remember, know, familiar, and guess in each of the retrieval conditions
in Experiment 2. A table of means with their 95% CIs are available in supplemental files at osf.io/vecmn
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was 0.014 for a model including retrieval condition, and for
KF the Bayes factor was 0.021 for a model including retrieval
condition, providing very strong evidence that retrieval con-
dition did not influence proportion of deep FAs assigned to
remember or KF.
Retrieval condition did produce a significant main effect on
proportion of FAs assigned to guess, F(3, 431) = 4.39,MSE =
.002, p = .005, ηp
2 = .030. A greater proportion of FAs were
assigned to guess in the RKfG condition and the RKG condi-
tion compared with in the RKFG condition (p = .004 and p =
.008, respectively); the proportions assigned to guess in the
RKfG and RKG conditions were also numerically higher than
the proportion assigned to guess in the RFG condition, but
using the Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level these differences
were not significant (p = .016 and p = .03, respectively).
Overall, fewer than .04 of responses were assigned to guess
in any retrieval conditions. The Bayes factor was 3.34 for a
model including retrieval condition, providing (barely) mod-
erate evidence that retrieval condition influenced proportion
of deep FAs assigned to guess.
In this experiment, in which deep and shallow items
underwent separate recognition tests, the different definitions
for the nonrecollection-based Bmiddle^ response option(s)
again resulted in a significant main effect of retrieval condition
for deeply encoded hits assigned to remember, KF, and guess.
More remember responses were made when only one
Bmiddle^ response option was given (RFG and RKG) com-
pared with when two options were provided (RKFG) or when
the middle option included both knowing and familiarity
(RKfG). The concomitant changes in proportion assigned to
KF occurred, but also fewer guess responses were made when
four response options were provided (RKFG) and the Bother^
option did not include high confidence without recollection.
FAs were rare in the deep condition, and the different defini-
tions only resulted in changes to proportions of guess re-
sponses, with fewer FAs assigned to guess in the RKFG con-
dition where two middle response options could be used—
know and familiar.
Shallow encoding—hits For items that had undergone shallow
encoding, overall levels of remember judgments for shallow
hits were ~.10 higher in the current experiment where the
recognition tests for deep and shallow were conducted sepa-
rately compared, with in Experiment 1 where shallow and
deep items were on the same recognition test (compare Figs.
1 and 2). In this experiment, the main effect of retrieval con-
dition on proportion assigned to remember was not signifi-
cant, F(3, 427) = 2.32, MSE = .058, p = .075, ηp
2 = .016.
Here, different definitions of know and/or familiar did not
significantly affect use of the remember response for correctly
recognized shallow items. The Bayes factor was 0.21 for a
model including retrieval condition, providing moderate evi-
dence in support of the null hypothesis that retrieval condition
did not influence proportion of shallow hits assigned to
remember.
For the pooled KF response category, there was a signifi-
cant main effect of retrieval condition on proportion assigned
to KF, F(3, 427) = 7.86, MSE = .026, p < .001, ηp
2 = .052. A
larger proportion of hits were assigned to KF in the RKFG
condition (M = .30, 95% CI [.27, .33]) than in the RKG con-
dition (M = .21, 95% CI [.18, .24]) or the RFG condition (M =
.21, 95% CI [.18, .24]; both ps < .001). The proportion of hits
assigned to KF in the RKfG condition was also numerically
higher than the proportion assigned to RFG and RKG, but
using the Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level these differences
were not significant (p = .016 and p = .009, respectively).
Fig. 3 Mean proportions of hits and FAs on the shallow recognition test assigned to remember, know, familiar, and guess in each of the retrieval
conditions in Experiment 2. A table of means with their 95% CIs are available in supplemental files at osf.io/vecmn
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The Bayes factor was 331.62 for a model including retrieval
condition, providing extremely strong evidence that retrieval
condition influenced proportion of shallow hits assigned to
KF.
There was a significant main effect of retrieval condition on
proportion assigned to guess, F(3, 427) = 17.03,MSE = .007,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .107. A greater proportion of hits were
assigned to guess in the RKfG condition and the RKG condi-
tion compared with in the RFG and RKFG conditions (all ps ≤
.001). The Bayes factor was 4.915 × 107 for a model including
retrieval condition, providing extremely strong evidence that
retrieval condition influenced proportion of shallow hits
assigned to guess.
Shallow encoding—false alarms For lures on the shallow rec-
ognition test, the main effect of retrieval condition on propor-
tion assigned to remember was not significant, F(3, 427) =
1.10, MSE = .004, p = .35, ηp
2 = .028. The Bayes factor was
0.041 for a model including retrieval condition, providing
strong evidence that retrieval condition did not influence pro-
portion of shallow FAs assigned to remember.
The main effect of retrieval condition was significant for
shallow FAs assigned to the pooled KF category, F(3, 427) =
3.22,MSE = .006, p = .023, ηp
2 = .022. A greater proportion of
FAs were assigned to KF in the RKFG condition (M = .08,
95% CI [.07, .10]) than in the RKfG condition (M = .06, 95%
CI [.04, .07]; p = .006), or the RKG condition (M = .06, 95%
CI [.04, .07]; p = .015), though this latter difference did not
reach the Bonferroni-adjusted significance level. Moreover,
the Bayes factor was 0.703 for a model including retrieval
condition, providing only anecdotal evidence that retrieval
condition did not influence proportion of shallow FAs
assigned to KF.
There was a significant main effect of retrieval condition on
proportion of FAs assigned to guess, F(3, 427) = 11.33, MSE
= .004, p < .001, ηp
2 = .074. A greater proportion of FAs were
assigned to guess in the RKfG condition than in the RFG or
RKFG conditions, and were assigned to guess in the RKG
condition compared with in the RKFG condition (all ps <
.001). The Bayes factor was 32,198.99 for a model including
retrieval condition, providing extremely strong evidence that
retrieval condition influenced proportion of shallow FAs
assigned to guess.
On the shallow recognition test, the different definitions for
the nonrecollection-based middle response option(s) did not
alter the proportion of responses assigned to remember, either
for hits or FAs, but did alter use of the KF and guess response
options. For both hits and FAs, more KF responses and fewer
guess responses were made when two middle response op-
tions were provided (RKFG) or when the middle option
consisted solely of familiarity (RFG). When the middle option
definition was based on high confidence without recollection,
more guesses were made.
General discussion
Patterns of subjective experience judgments were compared in
two experiments in which shallowly and deeply encoded
items were either tested in one recognition test (Experiment
1) or in separate blocked recognition tests (Experiment 2). In
both experiments, participants made their judgments using
one of four variants of RK response options; how remember
and guess were defined was kept consistent across those four
conditions, but definitions of the other response option(s)
were varied systematically. As a brief reminder, definitions
of know and/or familiar emphasized either a subjective expe-
rience of high confidence without recollection (RKG condi-
tion), a feeling of familiarity (RFG condition), both of these
experiences within one response option (RKfG condition), or
both of these experiences as separate response options (RKFG
condition).
The different retrieval options did not affect overall recog-
nition performance. But how the nonrecollective Bmiddle^
option(s) were defined did influence how participants used
the response categories, including the remember category.
That pattern was more evident when shallow-encoded and
deep-encoded items were both presented (alongside lure
items) within the same recognition test (Experiment 1).
When the shallow and deep tests were blocked (Experiment
2), the different definitions altered response patterns to a
smaller extent.
That the different retrieval conditions did not influence
overall recognition was expected; we did not predict that al-
tering how postrecognition subjective response options were
defined would change participant’s ability to discriminate old
from new items. In the study of subjective experiences, re-
searchers typically assume that what is actually experienced
at recognition is the same across standard (old/new) recogni-
tion tasks and tasks that require a postrecognition assessment
of the subjective nature of the retrieval experience (e.g., RK
tasks). However, a few researchers have tested whether the
mere inclusion of such judgments can alter recognition per-
formance; results have been mixed. Hicks and Marsh (1999)
found no difference in performance between standard recog-
nition and a two-step old/new then RK test, but hit rate and FA
rate were both increased when a one-step remember-know-
new judgment was used, which they suggested was due to
increased leniency when three response options have to be
considered at once. Using a Deese–Roediger–McDermott
false memory paradigm, Smith, Hunt, and Gallagher (2008)
found that, compared with standard recognition, one-step re-
member/know/guess/new (RKGN) recognition led to no dif-
ference for true memories, but decreased false memories for
items that had been visually presented. However, Smith et al.
did not count guess responses as Bold^ when calculating hit
and FA rates in the RKGN condition. Looking at their report-
ed values, if they had included guesses, there would have been
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no difference in the FA rates with and without an RK judg-
ment present, suggesting again that probing subjective expe-
riences does not change recognition ability.
Naveh-Benjamin and Kilb (2012) asked younger and older
adults to complete item (single word) and associative (paired
words) recognition tests with and without RK judgments. They
reported evidence that making RK judgments enhanced
associative recognition performance for the older adults, but
not for younger adults. However, Mulligan, Besken, and
Peterson (2010) showed that inclusion of RK judgments can
influence younger adults’ recognition. They found a modality
match effect (superior recognition when items are shown in the
same modality at study and test) only when an RK or source
judgment was included at recognition, not on standard recogni-
tion. They concluded that RK instructions can focus partici-
pant’s attention toward perceptual aspects of stimuli, which
can impact affect overall recognition rates when perceptual in-
formation is important. These mixed patterns of findings across
studies suggest that whether the mere presence of RK judg-
ments in a recognition task influences overall recognition per-
formance depends on other factors, such as participants, stimuli,
instructions, and definitions.2
Supporting previous work by Geraci et al. (2009), our find-
ings suggest that the level of confidence inherent in definitions
of know/familiar middle response option(s) influenced how
participants used these responses. But our most important
finding is that the change in the definition of the middle re-
sponse option(s) also changed how remember and guess re-
sponses were used, even though definitions of remember and
guess were kept constant. When the know definition included
a sense of high confidencewithout recollection (RKG, RKFG,
and RKfG conditions), fewer remember responses were made
for deeply encoded items compared with when the middle
response option was described as a familiarity-only-based
subjective experience (RFG condition). There was also some
evidence of this pattern for shallowly encoded items in the
nonblocked test of Experiment 1, but there was no significant
difference in how remember responses were used in the shal-
low block of Experiment 2. Use of the guess response was
minimal (≤10% in all conditions, even for FAs), but changes
to the definition of the middle option resulted in changes to
use of the guess response, with patterns mirroring those for the
remember response—fewer guess responses were made when
the middle response(s) included a familiarity-only-based sub-
jective experience (RKFG and RFG conditions).
The different test-list contexts in the two experiments also
apparently resulted in differential responding across retrieval
judgment conditions. In Experiment 1 there were significant
changes to how remember, KF, and guess responses were used
across retrieval judgment conditions for hits and FAs (though
remember was not significant for FAs). In Experiment 2 on the
recognition test for deeply encoded items there were no differ-
ences in proportion of FAs assigned to remember or KF, and on
the recognition test for shallow-encoded items there were no
differences in how either hits or FAs were assigned to remem-
ber. The removal of the deeply encoded items from the recog-
nition test-list context for shallow-encoded items in Experiment
2 appears to have meant that although the different Bmiddle
option^ definitions resulted in differences in how many
shallow-encoded items participants assigned to the know and/
or familiar and guess categories, this did not result in significant
changes to proportion of items assigned to remember as it had
done in Experiment 1, where the test-list context included both
deep-encoded and shallow-encoded items. This pattern concurs
with previous work suggesting that test-list context influences
the functional definitions of remembering and knowing that
participants use during a task (Bodner & Lindsay, 2003;
Tousignant & Bodner, 2012; Tousignant et al., 2015).
That definitions and context influenced use of judgments
fits with recent models of RK that suggest that both subjective
experiences can be considered continuous (Ingram et al.,
2012; Mickes, Seale-Carlisle, & Wixted, 2013; Wixted,
2007). Previous models had argued as to whether
recollection—the process conceptualized as underlying re-
member judgments—should be thought of as high threshold
(you either have it or you don’t; Yonelinas, 1994), or whether
remember and know judgments simply reflected different cri-
terion points on a continuum of memory strength or familiar-
ity (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004, 2008; Wixted &
Stretch, 2004). The continuous dual-process (CPD) model
proposed by Wixted and Mickes (2010) suggests that recog-
nition decisions are based on a continuous, unidimensional
memory strength signal, but that this consists of information
from separate continuous recollection and familiarity signals.
Furthermore, it suggests that participants can query memory
for the separable recollection and familiarity signals when
asked to do so. Wixted and colleagues have provided support
for this model in both recognition and recall paradigms
through finding that remember and know judgments for which
recognition accuracy and confidence had been equated were
still differentiated by source memory accuracy (Ingram et al.,
2012; Mickes et al., 2013). Their results suggest that the RK
distinction is not simply one of memory strength (R being
strong and K being weak), but that, when equal in strength,
remember experiences reflect retrieval of contextual informa-
tion, whereas know experiences reflect retrieval of item-only
information based on a sense of context-free familiarity.
Our data patterns confirm the model’s suggestion that differ-
ent definitions can affect where one sets their criteria for different
subjective experiences (Ingram et al., 2012). In line with Mickes
et al.’s (2013) suggestion that high-confidence and low-
confidence know responses are based on different underlying
processes (a recall-like process vs. perceptual fluency or
2 It is also possible that the variations in findings were due to low statistical
power.
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automaticity), our results show that systematically varied confi-
dence in know judgments influences how people use those judg-
ments, and this affects where they put their cutoff for what de-
termines a remembermnemonic signal and a know/familiarmne-
monic signal. In accordance with previous research (Geraci et al.,
2009; Ingram et al., 2012; Rotello et al., 2005), our findings
suggest that how people approach an RK task is determined, in
part, by the category distinctions researchers provide, and thus
responses are not a pure reflection of underlying processes or
retrieval of a particular form of information (Mickes et al., 2013).
The current experiments show that even small changes in
how the middle nonrecollective response option is defined to
participants can alter how participants use the remember re-
sponse (and the guess response). The implications of these
findings are that researchers should employ caution when
interpreting others’ remember/know findings, particularly
when evaluating patterns of responses across studies where
RK instructions have not been provided in full.
Should we give up on the remember/know paradigm? No.
Exploration of the subjective experiences associated with re-
trieval of different stimuli, under different instructions, or at
differing levels of confidence/memory strength continues to
be useful to increase understanding of how participants inter-
pret mnemonic traces and how these influence recognition
decisions (e.g., Uner & Roediger, 2018; Williams & Bodner,
2019). However, in line with recommendations put forward in
a review of RK procedures by Migo et al. (2012), we suggest
the best practice for researchers using the RK paradigm is to
publish the exact instructions given to participants, which
should include full definitions of the retrieval judgment op-
tions used in the experiment as well as describing how the
researchers checked that participants understood and followed
these instructions during the task. This will enable fully in-
formed cross-experiment comparisons to be made.
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